Official notice from manufacturer and way to proceed can be found in the link below:

https://flyozone.com/paragliders/infozone/safety-notices/f-race-2-safety-notice

MPORTANT SAFETY NOTICE

Lite, Lite PPG and Cockpit Rescue Containers

We have detected a manufacturing defect over one rescue handle delivered together with a reserve container. The following reserve containers produced between Jan 1st, 2021 and June 16th, 2025 might be concerned:

• Lite Rescue Container
• Lite Rescue Container PPG
• Cockpit Rescue Container

As a precaution, we ask that all container handles produced during this period be immediately taken out of use. The handles must be replaced before next use.

Please contact the retailer from whom you purchased your container to receive a free replacement handle after returning your handle, which will be destroyed.

The default affects the connection from the handle to container lanyard. This defect could result in the handle connection breaking before the reserve is fully deployed.

The replacement handles have a visible box-stitch pattern, as shown below.

https://flyozone.com/paragliders/infozone/safety-notices/front-container-rescue-handle-recall

After carefully reviewing and analyzing different parachute container setups — including the possibility of deployment difficulties caused by oversized containers or twisted lines — we at Niviuk would like to clarify that we have no evidence to suggest this is a widespread safety issue. Only a very small number of isolated cases have been reported. In response, even if isolated cases were reported, we have carried out in-flight tests to try to replicate the situations described. 

These flight tests were conducted using the Arrow P harness, equipped with a small rescue parachute with twisted lines (up to 4 full twists) entangled with the rescue handle strap. Tests carried out by the AirTurquoise certification laboratory, under the EN 12491:2015+A1:2021 standard, using a 20 kg release weaklink.

Importantly, the tests were done without any volume-reducing element in the rescue container. As shown in the video below, the parachute deployed and functioned correctly under these conditions. Please note that an automatic release system was used for the purpose of the test, as the objective was to analyze the parachute deployment phase only, not the descent itself:

Deployment tests

Nevertheless, we wanted to develop and offer a solution to address the few cases that have been reported. 

Rescue pocket volume reducer solutions

Date, 28.06.2025

IMPORTANT INFORMATION regarding Icaro TANDEM SPREADER

Dear ICARO partner!

Icaro - Safety notice

We have received feedback from a customer that problems have occurred with the tandem spreader. The reason is that the edges of the metal fitting on the carbon bar are too sharp, as they have not been deburred sufficiently. As a result, the webbing of the spreader can be damaged and, in the worst case, could be cut.  This only applies to spreaders from the batch from June 2024. The spreader must be inspected for any damage as described above before the next flight: - If there is no visible damage - please check the metal fittings of the carbon rod with regard to the edges and deburr the edges with sandpaper before the next flight.  - If there is visible damage to the spreaders, the spreaders must be replaced before the next flight. We therefore ask you to check carefully whether this is also the case with the spreader supplied to you. If you have any questions, please contact us. Thank you for your help. With kind regards Your ICARO Paragliders-Team 

It has been noticeed that the velcro inside the rescue container in charge of securing the adjustment flap for the parachute can catch the lines of the rescue making it imposible to deploy!

We recomend that users of this harness check that the velcro inside the container is completely covered by the flap and make sure that lines of the parachute are not sticked to the velcro.

Full report on manufacturer's website:  https://supair.com/securite/

Direct link: https://supair.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/info_safety_elevateurs-secours_en.pdf

Digest:

Download PDF from manufacturer's site

During a B-stall maneuver with a heavily used CHILI3 manufactured in 4/2014, several lines in the outer area broke. The pilot immediately deployed his reserve parachute and landed uninjured.

The inspection showed that the strength of the Technora lines was insufficient. In the case of the affected equipment, it’s most likely that frequent use in sand (dunes), as well as winch towing, led to an extraordinary weakening of the unsheathed Technora line. Comparable to a CHILI3 with a similar amount of wear, but without use in sand, the strength values of the affected lines were considerably higher.

skywalk nevertheless hereby issues the following safety notice in consultation with the DHV:

All CHILI3 owners are requested to check the protocol of the last inspection before the next flight. The value of the breaking strength of the line „small a1“ (LTC 85 daN Technora line) must be checked:

• If this value is 55 daN or higher, no further action is required until the next check.
• If the value is between 50 and 54 daN, the paraglider should get checked by an authorized check center within the next 20 flying hours.
• If the value is below 50 daN, the paraglider must be checked by an authorized check center before the next flight.
• If the breaking value of the line „a1“ is 54daN or less, two more lines (LTC 65 and LTC 45) must also be torn by the inspection company in order to check their strength as well.

CHILI3 owners who do not have a protocol of the last check of their CHILI3, please contact your skywalk dealer or skywalk directly before the next flight.

If you have any further questions, please contact us:
Skywalk GmbH & Co. KG
Windeckstr. 4
83250 Marquartstein
0049-8641-6948-0
support@skywalk.info

download PDF from manufacturer site

During our regular series control, we noticed that a few SALSA rescue systems had a 4 mm rubber line installed
on the inner container instead of a 3 mm rubber line. The strength of the rubber line and the associated elasticity determine how high the force must be to open the inner container through free fall and thus release the rescue chute into the airspace.

During the review of this drop test with a 4 mm rubber line, all rescue chutes were properly released and opened as planned. When checking this drop test with a 4 mm rubber line, all rescue devices were properly released and opened as planned. Nevertheless, we noticed an increased friction of the 4mm rubber line, so we decided to report it.

We recommend to check the thickness of the rubber cord on all SALSA inner containers of size 90, 110 and 135 and to convert the affected inner containers with a 3 mm rubber line. If your inner container is affected, please contact your skywalk dealer or skywalk directly.

For exchange, please note the following graphic

NOTE

The inner container only needs to be checked if the original 4-leaf container is still used.

If you have any questions please contact us:
Skywalk GmbH & Co. KG
Windeckstr. 4
83250 Marquartstein
0049-8641-6948-0
support@skywalk.info

A too long connection belt between reserve handel and pod gets entangled in the lines.
This prevents the pod to open.

Analyse and preconisations from DHV experts

see investigation report

The BHPA has just been made aware of a tragic accident that occurred in France on 14th July where the pilot and passenger of a tandem paraglider were killed when the spreaders broke at the connection point with the glider, leading to the complete separation of the pilot and passenger from the wing. The report from the French Federation FFVL (link in French) suggests that the age of the spreaders was probably the cause of the rupture. The FFVL recommends that all tandem pilots check the condition of their spreaders, or have them inspected by a professional. They should be replaced if there is visible wear or damage, if they have had 500hrs use, or if they are more than five years old.

The BHPA FSC recommends all of its members who fly tandem paragliders to take heed of the FFVL’s advice concerning spreader checks and replacement, and reminds pilots of the importance of regular condition checks on all of their tandem equipment. As the incident occurred very recently, further safety information may be published as the investigation progresses.

This notice has been posted on the BHPA website and on its Facebook page.

In 2018, 3 accidents were caused by the rupture in flight of the main carabiners on solo and tandem paragliders.
In 2019, one carabiner rupture during ground take-off phase, and begining of 2020, a new failure in flight occured on solo paragliders.

It turns out that one of the accidents involved a Chrome_Zicral_Austrialpin-Parafly automatic carabiner, two of the accidents involved 40mm_Zicral_Camp automatic carabiner distributed under the brand Woody_Valley.

These carabiners had more than 500h of "cross & thermal" flight and were used in solo paragliding, the most recent being 3.5 years old.

Expertises carried out by different laboratories confirmed the same type of brittle fracture, as end of fatigue crack propagation occurence.

Bright Chromium Surface Austrianalpin-Parafly carabiners had already been grounded on 12/14/2001 by DHV (Deutscher Hängegleiterverband e.V).

Following the last event, the 40mm-Zicral-Woody_Valley-Camp carabiners were prohibited from flying on 01/09/2020 by LAA-SR (Letecká Amatérska Asociácia - Slovenskej Republiky).

After analysis of available public documents, products derived from the Camp40 carabiner (Gin40, Niviuk40; Air-Xtreme40; and by extension Kortel40; Dudek40…) should also be very sensitive to this phenomenon of fatigue crack propagation. 05/28/2020, the FFVL published a security alert.

As a safety precaution, users are advised to inspect this equipment in detail in accordance with the maintenance guidelines published in December 2019 and to reform it case of doubt about the state of use.
Read here.
Download here.

19 months ago we released our safety note 01/2018 regarding the abnormal overextension of the XR7 rescue compartment elastic loops potentially leading to a rescue deployment failure. We’ve found out that if the knots at the base of the elastic loops aren’t well tight then the elastic loops overextended so we’ve replaced all the knots with sewed end stubs thus preserving the correct length of the elstic loops.

Inspection:
Open the long magnetic edge that covers the closing elastics of the rescue chute container and remove the metal pin connected to the rescue handle.
Make sure the white elactics can untie and don’t get entangled with each other.
More information: here.

The picture on the right shows a Quick-Out carabiner with a faulty mounted release button.
When setting up the production of the Quick-Out release buttons in January 2015, about 20 release buttons of one side were produced incorrectly. Some of these release buttons were accidentally mounted and at least one such faulty Quick-Out carabiner was put into circulation. The error eliminates one of the 4 security levels: To open the carabiner, it is sufficient to press only the correct release button instead of pressing both release buttons simultaneously.
At the final inspection, every single Quick-Out carabiner undergoes a load test of 2,000 DaN.
However, the error was not noticeable, since the stress test is also passed with only one release button intact.
If the Quick-Out is operated in accordance with the current version of our operating instructions, which are available for download on our homepage, the error will be noticed immediately. There it is described that the insert of the Quick-Out must click into place by strongly pressing it down (without
pressing the release buttons simultaneously). A faulty release button prevents this.
We urge all Quick-Out users to check the carabiners before the next use.
We have introduced additional testing procedures for the final inspection of the Quick-Out carabiners to reliably prevent such errors in the future.
Link to download the operating instructions: finsterwalder-charly.de/en/downloads.html
Finsterwalder GmbH • Pagodenburgstr.8 • D-81247 Munich
Phone: +49 89 8116528 • Mail: office@finsterwalder-charly.de • www.finsterwalder-charly.de

This safety notice applies to the Body speedriding harness only.
It does not apply to the Body Picture 1.0 or 2.0.

A series of occurrences or incorrect handling can in very exceptional cases trigger an unintentional opening of one of the two leg straps of the Body harness.
This phenomenon appears to be linked to the ageing of the harness and softening of fabrics.
Unintentional opening of the buckle cannot happen under tension when it is properly fastened.
Nonetheless as a result of improper or inadvertent handling, the buckle can flip around into an insecure position.

To this day no accident has occurred as a result of this issue. However, in order to ensure appropriate user safety, NEO invites owners of a Body harness with a serial number included in the following list to return their Body harness for modification:

- between B3004 and B3008
- between C3009 and C3191
- between C3234 and C3235
- between D3192 and D3233
- between E3236 and E3264
- between G3266 and G3268

These harnesses were produced between 2015 and 2019.

It is requested that affected harnesses are sent to NEO (ZA des Vernays, 74210 Doussard, France) or owners can contact their local dealer.
A modification eliminating associated risks will be made within a short period of time.

This Safety Notice affects All Original Ozium Harnesses (not the new Ozium 2).

We have had reported a case of failure during a simulated tyrolean deployment. The pins on the reserve deployment handles of all original Ozium harnesses may have been damaged during production. The damage, if present, may result in the pin breaking during deployment causing the reserve compartment to remain closed even if the handle is released. As the breakage is in an area hidden from view we are replacing all reserve handles as a precautionary measure.

Action required: Mandatory Replacement of Reserve Handle.

The reserve deployment handles on all Original Ozium harnesses should be replaced before next use. Please contact the dealer who sold you your Ozium harness to request a replacement handle. Replacement (GOOD) handles are clearly marked with blue bartacks. If your reserve handle has the blue bartacks, it has been replaced and is ok to fly. If the reserve handle does not, then it must be replaced. Please see photos at right.

For any questions regarding the replacement of the handle, please contact your local OZONE Dealer or Contact Ozone directly.

SUPAIR LEAF (standard version) “A” and “C” line settings.
A few LEAF were produced with a slow flying configuration and to the maximum allowed for certification approval tolerance.
Concerned products or affected products: LEAF in all sizes: XS, S, M, and L.
Note: that LEAF-LIGHT is not affected.
Problem description: Parachutal phases were observed on a few manufactured “Leaf” while pulling “Ears” in non-accelerated flight mode - the wing will come out of the parachutal phase as soon as the “Ears” are reopened.
More information here.

This notice affects all Exoceat harnesses manufactured before November, 2017.
We have been made aware of a potential safety issue with the Exoceat reserve handle. If the metal pin becomes fatigued due to repeated bending while packing the harness, there is a possibility that the handle could break during extraction.
Action required: Mandatory replacement of all Exoceat reserve handles.
The reserve deployment handles on all Exoceat harnesses should be replaced before next use. Please contact your dealer to request replacement handles.
The correct replacement handles are coloured red, if your reserve handles are made from transparent plastic then they must be replaced before your next flight.
For any questions regarding the replacement of the handle, please contact your local OZONE Dealer or Contact Ozone directly.

On 15 November 2016, the faulty assembly of a Quick‐Out carabiner lead to its accidental opening.

The pilot had dismounted both of the Quick‐Out’s release buttons and later re‐installed them in swapped positions.

Click here for more information.

Unwanted openings with automatic ventral aluminum buckles were observed in flight on some SUPAIR harnesses.

For more infos click here.